Victory Cult 

The Legacy of Communism in the Service of Putin’s State 

Every regime needs an ideological foundation and a set of myths to ensure public acceptance of its policies—and Putin’s Russia is no exception. Contemporary Russia draws upon multiple historical reference points for its ideological framework, ranging from medieval Rus’, through the Russian Empire under the Tsars, to the Soviet Union. The current policies of the Russian state require significant sacrifices from the population—not only on the battlefields of Ukraine, but also on the domestic front, where economic hardships are an inherent consequence of a wartime economy and a failure of the regime. 

Russia is a country full of contrasts and contradictions, one of which is its Victory Cult. Although the Soviet Union suffered enormous losses during the Great Patriotic War—approximately 27 million people killed and more than 2,000 towns and villages wiped off the face of the earth—the victory in that war became one of the cornerstones of modern Russian state ideology. 

День Победы (Victory Day), or победобесие (“victory frenzy” or “victory obsession”), is an ideology predominantly connected to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany on 9 May 1945. In modern Russia, it is commemorated through numerous military parades—the largest taking place annually in Moscow on 9 May—as well as songs, such as “Victory Day,” composed by David Tukhmanov with lyrics by Vladimir Kharitonov. 

During the Soviet era, the Victory Cult was intended to unite the population through pride in their achievement. It also served to legitimize the Soviet state and diminish public resentment toward the political and military leadership for the immense human cost of the war, much of which resulted from the incompetence of commanders and political leaders. After World War II, Stalin did not organize large-scale state commemorations of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. At the time, every military victory was associated with a specific commander, and Stalin feared the rise in popularity of wartime generals who could potentially challenge his authority. Celebrations of wartime successes might have strengthened the position of commanders such as Georgy Zhukov. 

The first Victory Parade after 1945 was held only in 1965, twenty years after the end of the war. That same year, 9 May officially became a public holiday. Today, there is hardly a family in Russia that does not know someone who participated in the Great Patriotic War. The Victory Cult is one of the few ideas capable of connecting wealthy Russians on luxury yachts in the Mediterranean with ordinary Russians living in remote villages in Siberia. 

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly emerged Russian Federation needed symbols capable of uniting its population under a common identity. One such symbol already existed: the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It represented a shared historical achievement for Russians and many other peoples of the former Soviet Union. Under Putin, this memory evolved into a cornerstone of a new state ideology emphasizing suffering, sacrifice, and Russia’s messianic role in world affairs. 

The current regime requires a connection to the country’s “glorious past” to justify its policies on both the international and domestic stages. In modern Russia, the Victory Cult is gradually assuming the role of a state religion and has become one of the central pillars of Putinism.  

Every religion needs symbols that play a crucial role in connecting people to a glorified past. One of the most recognizable examples is the Saint George Ribbon, which has been used by Russian forces in Ukraine as an identification symbol. The ribbon serves as a link between Russian nationalism, the legacy of the Tsarist Empire, and the memory of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. 

Another prominent symbol is the Armed Forces Cathedral, completed in 2020 to mark the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War. The cathedral serves not only religious purposes but also commemorates the military victories of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. As such, it functions as a physical manifestation of an ideology built upon religious, historical, nostalgic, and state-centered pillars. 

The average citizen is encouraged to believe in an eternally victorious Russia—a nation that, regardless of suffering or battlefield losses, will always emerge triumphant. Furthermore, Russia’s role in global affairs is portrayed as uniquely significant because it once liberated numerous nations from Nazism and fascism, albeit before plunging those nations back into authoritarian rule under communism. According to this narrative, Russia has a moral and even sacred duty to save “suffering nations” once again—today represented by the people of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. 

The Victory Cult no longer refers exclusively to the Second World War or even the Russian Empire. Instead, it increasingly presents Russia as the leader of a civilizational struggle, destined once again to liberate supposedly “enslaved” nations from the influence of NATO, the European Union, Ukraine, or, more broadly, the “decadent liberal West.” In this narrative, Russia is portrayed as the defender of traditional and conservative values, despite social realities that often contradict such claims. 

The guardians of this ideology seek to convince Russians that their motherland has never truly suffered defeat. Historically, this is inaccurate, yet the myth remains politically useful. But why is the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) commemorated so intensely in contemporary Russia? 

The answer lies in the message it conveys—not only to Russia’s own population but also to potential adversaries: “We did it once, and we can do it again.” The intensification of the Victory Cult following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine serves as another signal that Russia perceives itself as continuing a “holy war” against fascism and that it will not back down from this mission.  

Interestingly, in the Kremlin’s worldview, the term “fascism” has come to encompass virtually all enemies, including both the West and Ukraine. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet propaganda often used this term to describe the Germans, even though they were, more specifically, Nazis. 

Modern Russia continues to categorize its opponents in ideological terms while overlooking the fact that it is arguably the country that most closely resembles fascism in several respects, including its foreign and military policy, domestic governance, and economic system. 

Photo: 2020 Moscow Victory Day Parade by the Kremlin under CC BY 4.0.

The views and opinions expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation.