Hong Kong’s Red Shadow

Without a rapid paradigm shift, the ramifications of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interventionism may never be undone. Hong Kong will succumb to Captive Nation status, and the generational work of erecting a marvel of republicanism will be lost forever.

Given its Sino-British nature, Hong Kong’s consistent, top-tier rating on the Index of Economic Freedom speaks to the merit of both Western political philosophy and traditional Asian institutions. The Western contribution of separation of powers, commingled with the Asian component of legislative participation by institutional constituencies, ensures Hong Kong’s premier economic status in history. However, the CCP now casts a long shadow over this special region, and Hong Kong’s outstanding example of human potential sits on the precipice of Captive Nation status. 

During the development of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, Chapter I, Article 5 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law established a guiding principle. It was written to be the framework of the region’s control upon Hong Kong’s return to China due to the expiration of the UK’s lease of Hong Kong in 1997: 

“The socialist system and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years.” 

The National Security Law introduced in 2019 by mainland China led to large protests in Hong Kong and the ultimate dissolution of “One country, two systems” in 2020 via unethical legislative actions taken by the National People’s Congress (NPC). This abuse of power resulted in the constriction of protections for classically liberal rights in Hong Kong; these rights should have persisted for at least another twenty- seven years, per the multifaceted components contributing to the peaceful transition of control over Hong Kong from Britain to China in 1997. 

Prior to the NPC interventions in 2019, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’s (HKSAR) legislature stood as a marvel of institutional republicanism. A major comparative advantage of the HKSAR is transparency of patronage relationships between functional constituencies (FC), geographic constituencies (GC), and government organizations. Essentially, FCs and GCs are corporate, institutional and geographic social strata with constitutionally recognized sovereignty in Hong Kong. This consideration for FCs and GCs places their relationship with the government on full public display, archiving a record for each voting action adopted by their representatives in the legislative branch. The transparency in FCs’ choices provides a clearer view of the contributing factors to development of the HKSAR’s governance, compared to the US, where lobbyists, and other third-party actors, obscure how FCs exert influence upon the national government. 

This component of FC transparency cements the brilliance of the HKSAR’s constitutional political economy. Originally securing the interests of individual citizens by establishing that half of the unicameral Legislative Council’s (LegCo) seats derive from democratic voting, while a minority of LegCo seats are appointed by FCs. This proportion of power creates formal, multilateral channels for negotiations between the government, sovereign individuals (50% of the legislature), and sovereign institutions. This system is similar to how the bicameral U.S. Congress contains more representatives in the House than in the Senate, albeit with zero seats dedicated to FCs and GCs in either chamber. Unfortunately, the passing of the Hong Kong national security law in 2020 by the NPC dissolved many democratic political instruments, and subverted Hong Kong’s judicial autonomy (i.e. the power of final adjudication) by allowing mainland Chinese courts to intervene in cases of national security crimes. 

Initiated by the NPC in 2021, Beijing’s consolidation of power with these judicial distortions exacerbated the HKSAR electoral changes, which reduced democratic control of the LegCo’s 90 seats from 50% to 22%, and 40 of the LegCo seats are now elected by the revived Election Committee (EC), an electoral college responsible for electing the Chief Executive as well as 44% of the LegCo. With a cunning coup de grâce, the CCP took control of the Hong Kong Committee for Safeguarding National Security. A body with the power to review candidate eligibility for LegCo offices, Chief Executive, and the EC. This means that the CCP can leverage the EC for control over the legislative and executive branches. The CCP may also intervene judicially under the guise of “National security,” dissolving any semblance of separation of powers. Thus, subjecting all citizens to a tyrannical, single-party ruler. 

Hong Kong residents responded with waves of protests in 2019 and 2020, with over 25% of the region’s 7.5 million people marching at the peak of public discontent. As one might guess from this timeframe, protests were brutally suppressed in the name of COVID-19 public health concerns. Nearly 3,000 protesters have been prosecuted. 

The drastic removal of safeguards for classical liberalism astonished the business community, resulting in a mass flight of capital. Nations like the UK and Canada also eased access for Hong Kong residents to relocate to their respective countries. While the integrity of Hong Kong’s brilliant constitutional political economy must now submit to the caprice of the CCP, there is potential for a reformation; the constitutional architecture still underlies the HKSAR. Anglo-Saxons must pursue a civil discourse with the multivariate constituencies invested in the success of Hong Kong. Australia, Canada, the UK, the US, and others ought to coax the CCP away from these oligarchical distortions and towards timocratic reforms, progressing towards a superior form of government, as described in Plato’s “Republic.” 

The British and American system represent modern Anglo-Saxon culture. We are family united in history, governance, and law. As children of the British Empire, we ought to consider Hong Kong and America brothers, deontologically inclined towards Hellenic Philia, and thus accountable for one another.

Michael Farrell works in the U.S. Department of State in Knowledge Management. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or VOC.