

August 1st, 2024

## Preliminary Report on the Venezuelan 2024 Presidential Elections

### ***The electoral process did not meet the most basic democratic standards, and the results announced by the CNE have been forged, constituting massive fraud***

#### 1. Executive Summary

- Transparencia Electoral monitored Venezuela's electoral process from its call until election day on July 28 and the successive events that can only be classified as massive fraud.
- During the pre-electoral phase, there were serious obstacles to the registration and updating of data of nearly 5 million Venezuelans abroad of voting age (almost 25% of the electoral roll), as well as at least one million Venezuelans in the national territory, who could not update their addresses and change their voting centers.
- In addition to this, the political rights of several leaders were violated through illegal disqualifications (including that of María Corina Machado), judicial intervention in political parties, and the persecution of opponents and merchants who provided services to the campaign of Edmundo González, which left more than 100 arbitrary arrests in the framework of the elections, many of them constituted forced disappearances.
- The National Electoral Council (CNE, by its acronym in Spanish) was managed with what has become an institutionalized policy of information opacity, the scheduled activities and timelines were not met and the calendar was changed several times without prior notice. Furthermore, the actions of its president, Elvis Amoroso, ended any hint of institutionality. In fact, one of the five main directors of the CNE, Juan Delpino denounced that the board did not meet for months and that decisions were made unilaterally by Amoroso.
- During voting day, there were impediments to the entry of opposition witnesses into the voting centers, red zones (“*puntos rojos*”) near the precincts to control participation, use of State resources to benefit the ruling party, and lack of willingness for witnesses and citizens to observe the closing of polling stations and the citizen audit.



- Late Sunday night, the CNE announced, through its President Elvis Amoroso, that Nicolás Maduro had obtained 51.2% of the votes (5,150,092), while the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, won 44.2% of votes (4,445,978).
- Amoroso assured that the results were irreversible, although at the time of the announcement more than 2 million votes had yet to be counted (three times the difference between the candidates). The CNE did not publish the scrutiny tallies that supported the announced result. At the time of writing this report, more than 72 hours after the polls closed, the electoral authority has not published the tallies, and has already proclaimed Maduro as president-elect.
- The Democratic Unitary Platform (PUD) and Edmundo González's Campaign have made an extraordinary effort to digitize and publish more than 81% of the tallies at the national level (as of this Wednesday). With that total percentage, Edmundo González has 7,119,768 votes (67%), while Maduro obtains 3,225,819 votes (30%).<sup>1</sup>
- Collaborators of Transparencia Electoral in Venezuela verified the proper functioning of the PUD coalition platform and have accessed some of the tallies.<sup>2</sup>
- For its part, the Carter Center, the only international organization accredited to the CNE to oversee elections, considered this Wednesday that the elections did not adhere to international standards of integrity and cannot be considered democratic.<sup>3</sup>
- **Transparencia Electoral considers that the electoral process did not comply with the most basic democratic standards, and the results announced by the CNE have been forged, constituting a massive fraud.**

Contact: [info@transparenciaelectoral.org](mailto:info@transparenciaelectoral.org)

<sup>1</sup> <https://resultadosconvzla.com/>

<sup>2</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1818372714488631733>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-073024.html>



## 2. Voter registration abroad

One of the main criticisms of the electoral process is the serious irregularities committed during the process of registering and updating data of voters registered abroad. It is estimated that more than eight million Venezuelans are outside the country as a result of the ongoing crisis. Many of these citizens are still registered to vote in their home regions.

Although the current electoral law provides that electoral registration is continuous, it has been subject to arbitrary deadlines, which are not even respected in practice. Likewise, the procedure was plagued by irregularities and obstacles that made participation in the presidential elections difficult, such as the failure to open consulates on non-working days, non-compliance with established deadlines, requirements for documents that are not established by law, discrimination and misinformation towards Venezuelans abroad, as well as limitations on registration capacity.

The CNE set March 18 as the date for the opening of the registration process in the consulates, violating the continuous nature of the procedure, with a cut-off until April 16. However, the deadline was not even respected and many consulates did not open until April 2, which left a period of only a few days (taking into account the non-working days and Easter holidays, in which the consulates did not open) to enroll hundreds of thousands or even millions of people. Ultimately, many were unable to do so.

Outside the limited deadlines, it was reported that the consular headquarters did not timely communicate the promotion of registration and updating of data before the CNE to Venezuelans abroad, as well as some of the requirements (creating arbitrary requirements that are not part of the legal system). This misinformation and negligence on the part of the consular authorities, added to the failure to comply with the already short deadlines, affected the possibility of Venezuelans abroad to register or update their data.

Another rudeness came with the impossibility of voting for Venezuelan citizens located in countries with which Venezuela has suspended its diplomatic relations, in particular the United States and Canada (where there are respectively 37,000 and 5,000 voters already duly registered), since the vote can only be issued in authorized consulates. These voters were not able to cast their vote, as they continue to appear as voters in consulates that are not operational.

Ultimately, the result is obvious from the numbers. Of a diaspora estimated at more than eight million people, only 3,506 Venezuelan citizens were able to register or properly update their data, with particularly discouraging figures in countries such as Colombia or Chile. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (which has expressed its concern about this situation, demanding that a channel be provided to correct it) places the number of Venezuelan emigrants with the right to vote at potentially five million people. From the beginning, the process appears harmed by this violation of the rights of all these voters.



The report presented by Mi Voto Cuenta provides a comparison of Venezuelans residing in different countries around the world with respect to the number of Venezuelans that the CNE enabled to participate in the July 28 process.

<b>Country</b>	<b>Venezuelan Population</b>	<b>Of voting age (67%)</b>	<b>Registered and updated in the 2024 Registry</b>
Colombia	2.880.000	1.929.600	273
Perú	1.540.000	1.031.800	66
Ecuador	474.900	318.183	387
Chile	444.400	297.748	607
Spain	438.300	293.661	1829
Argentina	217.700	145.859	440
Rep. Dominicana	124.100	83.147	18
México	113.100	75.777	768
Panamá	58.000	38.994	450
Uruguay	32.900	22.043	37
Fuente: Mi Voto Cuenta			



Regarding the duration of registration, according to the My Vote Account report, the average in which a consulate was open was 11.5 days, just a little more than half of the time expected for registration. The consulate that was open the longest was the one in Paris (the only one that opened during Easter) and reported only fifteen days, and the only one that is known to have opened on Saturdays and Sundays was the one in Berlin. The consulate that was open the shortest time was that of San José, Costa Rica, with only six days.

### 3. Candidate registration

The registration of presidential candidates before the CNE took place from March 21 to 25, 2024. Previously, María Corina Machado filed an appeal for protection against her disqualification before the Supreme Court (which was rejected). Having exhausted the avenues to see her candidacy authorized by the CNE and seeking to prevent the PUD from being left out of the race, Machado announced her support for the candidacy of academic Corina Yoris, through the electoral card of the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD, by its acronym in Spanish).

However, during the application process, the PUD was not able to pass the first phase established by the CNE's automated system, as it did not accept the keys from those authorized to apply, while the rest of the authorized political organizations were able to do so. No problem. The PUD requested an extension on March 24, without success. Almost at midnight on the deadline, the leader of the opposition party Un Nuevo Tiempo, Manuel Rosales, managed to register his candidacy under unclear circumstances.

Throughout the following day, the governments of Colombia and Brazil, led by presidents Gustavo Petro and Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, generally considered allies of the Maduro regime, issued criticism of the blockade without explanation of Yoris' candidacy. which was seen as unusual pressure on the regime to authorize a Unitary Platform candidate to compete. Finally, the CNE granted a twelve-hour extension on the 26th, during which the Unitary Platform was able to register the diplomat Edmundo González Urrutia. Initially, González agreed to occupy the position as a "cover candidate" (that is, temporary) to safeguard the Democratic Unity Roundtable card until the final candidate was chosen before the deadline for replacements on April 23. However, during that period, regime figures implied that the withdrawal could only be made official for the benefit of an already registered candidate.

In this context, the PUD confirmed González as the definitive candidate for the presidency of the coalition, with the support of María Corina Machado and the other parties of the alliance. Manuel Rosales announced that he was declining his candidacy in favor of González on April 19, which earned him the support of his party (UNT) and the Movement for Venezuela party (which also supported Rosales).

Once again, attempts at sabotage were reported in the process to transfer the support of UNT and MPV cards from Rosales to González, reporting that the CNE once again tried to slow down the process beyond the deadlines. Only on April 23, the last day to register, did the CNE admit Rosales' withdrawal and González's application through the UNT and MPV cards.



#### 4. Action of the National Electoral Council

The organization of the electoral process was accompanied by successive audits of its different components. However, as with the rest of the administration, the CNE has shown great communication opacity in the execution of its activities, which includes the lack of clear and timely information on the electoral registry and audits. Above all, the lack of adherence due to the established schedules (both from the Electoral Registry and other organizational points) shortened the deadlines for many activities and hindered their completion in a timely manner.

The Electoral Registry audit saw a significant lack of official information on the details of the preliminary registration, including new voters and updates both inside and outside the country. This forced us to resort to secondary sources to obtain data and, although the electoral registry audit process was extended by days compared to the original schedule, the lack of official details has been a constant problem.

Although they could be carried out effectively, the audits for the automated voting system also had multiple problems. The audit of the voting machine software, a key review in each Venezuelan election, saw its stipulated period reduced from five to four days without any justification, while the tallies of the comprehensive audit of the automated system were known days after the audit was carried out.

The participation of independent observation has been very limited. The attendance of witnesses from political parties and organizations such as the Council of Electoral Experts of Latin America (CEELA) and the Office of Strategic Planning for Regional Integration (OPEIR), both subordinate to the government, has been recorded in the audit tallies, which do not serve as a parameter. Likewise, although in theory the presence of national electoral observation organizations is allowed, a small number of organizations (the Assembly of Education Electoral Observation Network) attended the audits online and at that time did not have the corresponding accreditation.

In this way, the audits essential for the transparency and credibility of the election have been marked by a lack of information, the reduction of deadlines without justification, and the limited participation of independent observers. These factors, together with the actions of the CNE and the political context, raise concern about the integrity of the electoral process.



One of the main five directors (*Rectores*) of the CNE, Juan Carlos Delpino, in the month of June issued statements that alarmed national public opinion. After a long silence since the 2024 Presidential Election was announced, Delpino affirmed that there were important irregularities in the operation of the electoral body within the framework of the election. Among the deficiencies, he pointed out that the ordinary meetings of a collegiate body have not taken place for several months, in addition that the president of the organization had assumed powers beyond his constitutional capacities and, even more serious, that the decision-making of the organization had been strongly influenced by agents external to the CNE.

This deficient, irregular and highly politicized performance of the governing body of the Electoral Branch (as it's known in Venezuela), appointed in 2023, after the resignation of the directors (*Rectores*) linked to the ruling party, which allegedly forced the 2020 National Assembly to make a new designation of the board and which led to a governing body with a majority clearly linked to the ruling regime, can be analyzed in light of several of its actions, among them, the eminently political decision to withdraw the invitation to participate as an international electoral observation body for the European Union. On the same page is the discursive line in the CNE communications, in response both to the Government of the United States, for its position regarding the elections in Venezuela, and to the European Union, in response to the decision of this instance to partially lift just some of the sanctions against officials or former officials of the Venezuelan electoral body.

In the same vein, the CNE's request to the presidential candidates to sign a document recognizing the electoral results stands out, which was finally endorsed by all, with the exception of Edmundo González and Enrique Márquez, arguing that said recognition of results was already included in the Barbados Agreement or that he disagreed with signing "blank checks", respectively. The reaction of the president of the CNE against those who did not adhere to the document was unconstitutional and clearly biased.

The CNE did not respect the dates and periods of the schedule, it acted with extreme information opacity, and this is reflected in the very poor institutional and communication campaign both in the information about the electoral process and in the promotion of its main activities, the late publication of the operating manual, and the late publication and change in the regulations for the accreditation of electoral witnesses<sup>4</sup>.

It should also be highlighted the confusing data of the final electoral registry at the time of its publication, due to the lack of complete, official and timely information from the CNE and to facts such as the application of criteria outside the Law in the design of the electoral registry, specifically with the purge of voters in countries such as the United States of America and Canada, but not Ecuador, because they are registered in countries where embassies and

---

<sup>4</sup> Normas especiales y procedimiento para extender las credenciales a los testigos electorales de las organizaciones con fines políticos. Elección Presidencial 2024, publicadas en la Gaceta Electoral N° 1060, de fecha 20 de junio 2024.

[http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/gacetas\\_electorales/gacetas/2024/gaceta\\_electoral\\_1060.pdf](http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/gacetas_electorales/gacetas/2024/gaceta_electoral_1060.pdf)



consulates are not operational as a result of the suspension of diplomatic relations with Venezuela and; complaints of subsequent changes in the figures, specifically with regard to electoral infrastructure (voting centers and polling stations)<sup>5</sup>.

---

<sup>5</sup> “CNE volvió a modificar los datos de la infraestructura electoral del #28J Después de la revisión definitiva del tabla mesa para la elección presidencial se habilitarán 15.797 centros de votación. En estos centros estarán dispuestas 30.026 mesas de votación”. <https://x.com/puzkas/status/1801756568179864025>

## 5. Electoral violence

Although there were no murders during the campaign period, failed attempts, or alterations with the use of firearms in electoral events, there were different manifestations of electoral violence, understood as this, according to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), such as random or organized acts intended to intimidate, physically harm, destroy public or private property, or other action that influences the electoral process. For his part, Marco points out that actions of electoral violence should be included: murders, assaults, arson, looting, damage or destruction of private property, kidnappings, threats, sexual assault, invasion of competitors' offices, among others.<sup>6</sup>

Given the variety of acts that can be considered electoral violence in the Venezuela 2024 Presidential Election, a systematization proposal is proposed below that allows for a comprehensive approach to the phenomenon, using some recent examples:

- Arbitrary arrests and forced disappearances of people linked to the democratic opposition
- Harassment of people linked to the democratic opposition
- Death threats to María Corina Machado and vandalization of the vehicles that transported her
- Psychological terrorism. Nicolás Maduro warned at an election campaign event: "The destiny of Venezuela, in the 21st century, depends on our victory on July 28. "If they do not want Venezuela to fall into a bloodbath, into a fratricidal civil war, a product of the fascists, let us guarantee the greatest success, the greatest victory in the electoral history of our people." For his part, Diosdado Cabello, Vice President of the PSUV, expressed: "The objective is to set the country on fire from the communications point of view." Jorge Rodríguez, President of the National Assembly and Head of the Maduro 2024 Campaign, asserted: "We are going to recognize the verdict of the CNE and we will go to the streets of Venezuela to defend the victory even with our own lives."<sup>7</sup>
- Attacks against media outlets and journalists (media closure, detention of journalists, closure of portals)
- Obstruction with the use of force to prevent access to the mobilization of the democratic opposition

---

<sup>6</sup> En Alvarado Mendoza, Arturo. 2019. Violencia política y electoral en las Elecciones de 2018. [https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttext&pid=S0188-70172019000100059](https://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188-70172019000100059)

<sup>7</sup> <https://x.com/jorgerpsuv/status/1814645041651945901>



- Pecuniary sanctions and closure of hotels, restaurants and other establishments that provided services to the democratic opposition
- Disqualifications of elected authorities in office and dismissals at different levels of people linked to the democratic opposition
- Seizures and confiscations of assets from people who served the democratic opposition
- Threats with non-democratic regulatory frameworks that promote the persecution of sectors of the population. Approval in first discussion of the Bill of the Law against Fascism, Neo Fascism and similar expressions. (April 2, 2024)<sup>8</sup>

---

8

<https://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/noticias/an-aprueba-en-primera-discusion-proyecto-de-ley-contra-el-fascismo>

## 6. Election observation

Under the figure of “international observers”, the CNE accredited the Council of Electoral Experts of Latin America (CEELA), which participated in several in-person audits, as well as the Office of Strategic Planning for Regional Integration (OPEIR). These organizations are close to the government and in the case of CEELA, it has even issued positive reports on electoral processes in Venezuela in which there has been fraud. It is also known from other international figures (for example, the Independent National Electoral Commission of Burkina Faso) who, according to tallies, attended the audits but, like OPEIR, remotely through the Zoom platform.

The Carter Center<sup>9</sup> and the United Nations<sup>10</sup> participated through the form of an expert panel. In the case of the first, he was present at the electoral simulation and in person at the most recent audits, until two days after the election, when they had to leave the country unexpectedly.

According to the Chancellor of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yván Gil, 635 international observers<sup>11</sup> were confirmed for the Venezuelan Presidential Election 2024. Far from being a rigorous electoral observation, they were “foreign visitors”, most of them militants of parties and social movements related to the government of Nicolás Maduro.

In the case of national electoral oversight, two organizations participated remotely in some of the audits: Education Assembly Observation Network (ROAE) and Social Project, although they received their credentials a few days before election day.

---

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/2024/venezuela-062124-sp.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> <https://x.com/cneesvzla/status/1811484443216888036?s=46>

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x91y0em>

## 7. Election campaign

In the completion of the actions<sup>12</sup> carried out within the framework of the electoral pre-campaign<sup>13</sup> of both Nicolás Maduro and the democratic opposition led by María Corina Machado and the candidate Edmundo González (MUD, UNTC and MPV parties) and, to a much lesser extent, of the other candidates for President of the Republic, in addition to the massive and growing mobilizations of the democratic opposition and the small concentrations of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, statements by high representatives of the Bolivarian National Beloved Force with clear proselytizing nuances could be observed. and propaganda in favor of the Maduro government<sup>14</sup>; specifically the active military Vladimir Padrino López, Minister of Defense and Domingo Hernández Lárez<sup>15</sup>, Strategic Operational Commander of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces. In addition to that, the spread of *fake news*<sup>16</sup> against Edmundo González, the falsification and manipulation of polls<sup>17</sup> and the use of public resources by the candidate and ruling party were confirmed<sup>18</sup>.

The electoral campaign began on July 4, according to the Electoral Schedule. The special regulations that regulate the electoral campaign, - beyond the Organic Law of Electoral Processes and its regulations -, particularly what refers to spaces in audiovisual and printed

---

<sup>12</sup> Para más ver información sobre las movilizaciones antes de la campaña electoral. Elección Presidencial Venezuela 2024, ver

<https://transparenciaelectoral.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/III-Informe-Transparencia-Internacional-3.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> La precampaña electoral está expresamente prohibida en el Artículo 75.1 de la Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales y en el Artículo 204.1 de su Reglamento General, aunque el Consejo Nacional Electoral desde hace ya varios años ha hecho caso omiso de dicha práctica, la cual se ha convertido en constante en los últimos procesos electorales.

<sup>14</sup> La Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela destaca el carácter institucional, profesional y sin militancia política de los miembros de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana y a la par prohíbe expresamente su participación en actos de propaganda, militancia partidista y acciones proselitistas. Artículos 328 y 330.

<sup>15</sup> <https://x.com/dhernandezlarez/status/1804526869993103837?s=46>

<sup>16</sup> “Yerno de Edmundo González tiene una investigación criminal por narcotráfico en los EEUU”.

<https://www.instagram.com/cazamosfakenews/reel/C8-QH8Uh31E/>;

<sup>17</sup> “La coalición informativa C-Infoma analizó 14 firmas encuestadoras y encontró que seis de ellas, de reciente creación y dudosa credibilidad, publicaron 37 estudios de opinión pública que fueron usados en una estrategia que busca manipular el clima electoral en Venezuela”.

<https://www.medianalisis.org/seis-encuestadoras-sospechosas-promocionan-coordinadamente-a-nicolas-maduro-como-favorito-para-el-28-j/>

<sup>18</sup> La Organización No Gubernamental Transparencia Electoral, en su informe *Seis meses antes de las elecciones en Venezuela: Desinformación y recursos públicos en juego (2024)*, destaca: “Entre enero y junio de 2024, antes de comenzar la campaña electoral, de acuerdo con el registro de Dilo Aquí y Espaja, Transparencia Venezuela contó 152 irregularidades que aluden, por ejemplo, a alcaldes, ministros y otros funcionarios de alto rango que usan canales de comunicación del Estado para hacer campaña a favor del candidato del PSUV y presidente Nicolás Maduro o que exigen a trabajadores públicos seguir en sus redes las cuentas de Nicolás Maduro y enviar capturas de pantalla que lo comprueben”... “El uso de recursos públicos con fines proselitistas, incluso antes del periodo de campaña, muestra al candidato del PSUV bailando sobre un camión de la Guardia Nacional Bolivariana, a alcaldes utilizando autobuses del Estado para transportar personas a concentraciones convocadas por su comando de campaña”... “

media and even technological platforms and portals and social networks, was published the night before in the Electoral Gazette No. 1061<sup>19</sup>. Among the changes regarding the campaign regulations for the 2021 Regional and Municipal Elections, there are: the monitoring of propaganda through Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), including social networks, by the CNE together with the National Telecommunications Council (CONATEL) and the balance in coverage and equitable participation in programs, a device that is already included in the Law.

The use of resources, officials and public organizations<sup>20</sup> in favor of the ruling party was evident, which is expressly prohibited in the Constitution and the Law<sup>21</sup>; the worsening of electoral violence; the messages that have attacked the honor of the candidate Edmundo González such as the description of a murderer by Diosdado Cabello, in a program on the public television channel Venezolana de Televisión<sup>22</sup> or the disqualification, to the point of discrimination, towards the candidate González and María Corina Machado by Nicolás Maduro, referring to them as decrepit old men<sup>23</sup> and the continuation of the falsification and manipulation of electoral polls<sup>24</sup>.

---

<sup>19</sup> Normativa especial sobre campaña y propaganda electoral para la elección presidencial 2024, a celebrarse el 28 de Julio de 2024. Gaceta Electoral N° 1061 de fecha p0 de Julio de 2024.

[http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/gacetas\\_electorales/gacetas/2024/gaceta\\_electoral\\_1061.pdf](http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/gacetas_electorales/gacetas/2024/gaceta_electoral_1061.pdf)

<sup>20</sup> De acuerdo a la Organización No Gubernamental Laboratorio de Paz, 26,4% de los sitios web oficiales hacen campaña a favor de Nicolás Maduro, 91,1% de las cuentas Twitter (X) realizan campaña a favor de Nicolás Maduro y 76,4% de los perfiles Instagram oficiales realizan campaña a favor de Nicolás Maduro.

<https://x.com/LabPazVe/status/1813709484575142250>. Transparencia Electoral, señala que hay 27 casos de organismos y funcionarios públicos que han hecho campaña electoral a favor de Nicolás Maduro y también hay uso de recursos públicos. <https://x.com/NoMasGuiso/status/1813332784578257334>

<sup>21</sup> La prohibición del uso de recursos públicos a favor de una parcialidad política está definida en el Artículo 145 de la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela; los Artículos 75.13, 76 y 230.4 de la Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales; los Artículos 204.14, 205, 211, 221, 222, 223 y 237 del Reglamento General de la Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales y; los Artículos 14, 18 y 77 de la Ley Contra la Corrupción

<sup>22</sup>

<sup>23</sup> <https://x.com/albertorodnews/status/1809663469068911033?s=46>

<sup>24</sup> Ya iniciada la campaña electoral, se intentó manipular información sobre encuestas electorales, dentro de lo que destaca Poder y Estrategia <https://x.com/riosdefrente/status/1811068149522968713?s=46>; Zuban

[https://x.com/zuban\\_cordoba/status/1811072262885331124?s=46](https://x.com/zuban_cordoba/status/1811072262885331124?s=46) y CECA Consultores

<https://x.com/AlbertoRodNews/status/1811435280039321600>

## 8. Training for polling station authorities

The training for polling station authorities was done remotely, through the link included on the CNE website<sup>25</sup>. This process doesn't only allows all the members selected for each polling station to be trained<sup>26</sup>, but also accredits them to fulfill their functions in the different events associated with the polling station.

Since the beginning of the training for polling station members, multiple complaints arose, mainly in three areas: access to the training link on the CNE website; operation of the municipal (in-person) training centers, to be used exceptionally and; obtaining the board member credential. The problems upon entry arose among other reasons due to the accessibility of the platform; to the changes generated by the CNE with the preliminary and final electoral records, regarding the creation or elimination of voting centers and/or migration of voters and; to the exceptions to the mandatory electoral service. These difficulties were apparently solved.

Regarding the municipal (in-person) training centers<sup>27</sup>, it was reported that they did not function where they were supposedly located or allowed training only to voting center coordinators and operators of the integrated system. Regarding the credential as a polling station member, the complaints focused on the impossibility of obtaining it after completing the training for which, the CNE Call Center (800-Votemos) and support, such as the case of specialized journalist Eugenio Martínez<sup>28</sup>, and the Alternate Electoral Rector of the CNE, Ana Julia Niño<sup>29</sup> tried to facilitate the process, although numerous complaints were registered in this regard. The CNE Call Center reported that if difficulties persist in obtaining the credential, we would have to wait for the solution through the same CNE application or

---

<sup>25</sup> <https://ecap.cne.gob.ve>

<sup>26</sup> De acuerdo al proceso de selección de integrantes de los organismos electorales subalternos y el Manual de Mesa Electoral, la Mesa electoral está integrada por Presidente, Un miembro principal y un Secretario, éste último sin derecho de voto. Esto contraría lo definido en Ley Orgánica del Poder Electoral que contempla que todos los organismos electorales subalternos deberán estar integrados por al menos cinco miembros (Artículo 55) y complica su naturaleza de cuerpo colegiado, al establecer la toma de decisiones a través de un número par (Artículos 119 de la Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales y 51 y 105 del Reglamento General de la Ley Orgánica de Procesos Electorales). (Esto ya ocurrió en las Elecciones Regionales y Municipales 2021). desde Para cada mesa electoral se escogen Un presidente, Un miembro principal, Un Secretario, Ocho miembros suplentes y Diecinueve miembros suplentes.

[http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/normativa\\_electoral/elecciones/2024/eleccion\\_presidencial/documentos/acta\\_a\\_auditoria\\_software\\_de\\_sioes.pdf](http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/normativa_electoral/elecciones/2024/eleccion_presidencial/documentos/acta_a_ auditoria_software_de_sioes.pdf)

<sup>27</sup>

[http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/normativa\\_electoral/elecciones/2024/eleccion\\_presidencial/documentos/centros\\_capacitacion\\_municipal\\_2024.pdf](http://www.cne.gob.ve/web/normativa_electoral/elecciones/2024/eleccion_presidencial/documentos/centros_capacitacion_municipal_2024.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> <https://x.com/puzkas/status/1812307994631135567>

<sup>29</sup> <https://x.com/anajulia07/status/1812278257380945957>



delivery subsequently, directly and in person, by the coordinator of the corresponding voting center <sup>30</sup>.

---

<sup>30</sup> <https://x.com/puzkas/status/1811777731534700638>

## 9. Voting Day

According to Venezuelan legislation, the Act of Constitution of the Board takes place at 5:00 in the morning, and the Voting Act begins at 06:00 in the morning and lasts until 06:00 in the morning. late. Voting centers must close at this time unless there are voters in line.

According to Principal Rector Aime Nogal, by 6:00 a.m. in the morning only 51.75% of the polling stations had been set up and by 6:30 a.m. 59.40% of the polling stations had opened.<sup>31</sup>

Although Transparencia Electoral was not accredited by the CNE to observe the elections, it did remote monitoring and had a team of collaborators in Venezuela and in several cities abroad where the diaspora could vote, including Madrid, Buenos Aires, Santiago of Chile and Mexico City.

He also received information from the Democratic Unitary Platform, which had witnesses throughout the national territory.

Before addressing the start of election day, we must say that between Friday, July 26 and the morning of July 28, the vast majority of reports were received related to the replacement of polling station members with accidental members.

On Sunday the 28th, the vast majority of the tables were established and started the day at the established time, but reports were received in different locations in the country of delays in the constitution and opening, especially due to the non-attendance of the polling station authorities.

Regarding irregularities, the installation of “red dots”<sup>32</sup> in the vicinity of voting centers, the attempt to scan identity cards by representatives of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)<sup>33</sup>, and even attacks with firearms on voters that left them injured<sup>34</sup>.

Students from the National Experimental University of Security denounced that members of the Plan República and CNE coordinators forced voters to be accompanied to vote under the figure of “assisted voting”<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>31</sup> <https://x.com/anogal/status/1817524680393113637>

<sup>32</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817602107739906324>

<sup>33</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817602916468822239>

<sup>34</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817609803029766328>

<sup>35</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817626355950928110>



The communication from the National Electoral Council about the election day was very poor, so the Electoral Transparency monitoring was based on the information provided by the Edmundo González Campaign Command, which reported at 10:00 a.m. a participation of 17%<sup>36</sup>, at 1:00 in the afternoon 42.1%, and at 4:00 a.m. 54.8%.

In the afternoon, Delsa Solórzano, an electoral witness for the Democratic Unitary Platform, reported that she was not allowed to enter the CNE<sup>37</sup>. Hours after the polls closed, Solórzano assured that the transmission of the tallies from different voting centers had stopped, and warned that Edmundo González's Command had enough tallies from its witnesses "to know what happened in the country"<sup>38</sup>.

---

<sup>36</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817589572035088767>

<sup>37</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817676453766451365>

<sup>38</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817758941062799537>

## 10. Announcement of results and proclamation of Nicolás Maduro Moros without publication of tallies

Late on Sunday night, the National Electoral Council announced, through its President Elvis Amoroso, that with 80% of the tallies, Nicolás Maduro had obtained 51.20% of the votes (5,150,092), while the opposition candidate, Edmundo González, won 44.20% of the votes (4,445,978)<sup>39</sup>.

Amoroso assured that the trend was irreversible, although at the time of the announcement more than 2 million votes had yet to be counted (three times the difference between the candidates). The CNE did not publish the scrutiny tallies that supported the announced result<sup>40</sup>

However, the CNE did not publish the tallies that supported this result when it gave the first informative report, something that the electoral body used to do in previous elections (although it did not do so in the popular consultation on Essequibo in December 2023). At the time of writing this report (August 1) the tallies had not yet been published. It is worth saying that according to the legislation, the CNE has 48 hours to totalize the scrutiny tallies, and can extend this period for up to 24 more hours<sup>41</sup>, so that this deadline has already expired and the tallies were not published.

For its part, Edmundo Gonzalez's Campaign Command responded to this statement saying that the results announced by the CNE were not true, and that on the contrary, the scrutiny records held by the Democratic Unitary Platform gave González 70 % of the votes.

This triggered a series of international reactions: the government of Costa Rica described Maduro's proclamation as "fraudulent"<sup>42</sup>, the president of Chile, Gabriel Boric, assured that the results were "hard to believe"<sup>43</sup>, while the Secretary of State of the United States, Anthony Blinken, showed "serious concerns that the announced results do not reflect the desire or votes of the Venezuelan people"<sup>44</sup>.

On Monday, July 29, after receiving information from Edmundo González's Campaign Command, Electoral Transparency considered that "the electoral process has probably been

<sup>39</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cn38n9knl3no>

<sup>40</sup>

<https://transparenciaelectoral.org/los-resultados-emitidos-por-el-cne-no-deben-ser-reconocidos-hasta-que-publiquen-las-actas-de-escrutinio/>

<sup>41</sup>

[https://www.sumate.org/documentos/Marco\\_Legal\\_Electoral\\_Venezuela/XReglamento\\_General\\_LOP\\_RE\\_2013.pdf](https://www.sumate.org/documentos/Marco_Legal_Electoral_Venezuela/XReglamento_General_LOP_RE_2013.pdf)

<sup>42</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817788671145161174>

<sup>43</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817792899687371060>

<sup>44</sup> [https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/07/29/estados-unidos-serias-preocupaciones-resultados-electoral-es-venezuela-trax/#:~:text=\(CNN\)%20%2D%2D%20EI%20secretario%20de,%2C20%25%20de%20lo%20s%20votos.](https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/07/29/estados-unidos-serias-preocupaciones-resultados-electoral-es-venezuela-trax/#:~:text=(CNN)%20%2D%2D%20EI%20secretario%20de,%2C20%25%20de%20lo%20s%20votos.)



the most irregular in recent times, marked by the autocratic nature of the government. The results issued by the National Electoral Council cannot be recognized until the scrutiny records that support it are published, which must be those issued by the voting machines<sup>45</sup>.

The Carter Center<sup>46</sup>, the UN Secretary General<sup>47</sup> and the European Union<sup>48</sup> did the same and asked the CNE to immediately publish the voting tallies.

On Monday, July 29, at night, María Corina Machado and Edmundo González gave a press conference in which they assured that "we have 100% of the CNE tallies and this information agrees that Edmundo González Urrutia obtained 70 % of the votes and Nicolás Maduro 30%

The Democratic Unitary Platform made available a [web page](#) where voters can enter with their ID number and access the scrutiny report from their voting center. Collaborators of Electoral Transparency in Venezuela entered the portal and were able to contrast the digitized tally sheets with the physical ones from their voting station<sup>49</sup>.

We must point out that this initiative is not new. In fact, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) did the same in 2013<sup>50</sup>.

They also created a [website](#) to view the totalized results. At the time of writing this report, 81.85% of the scrutiny records were uploaded, which show a result of 67% for Edmundo González, 30% for Nicolás Maduro, and 2% for the rest of the candidates.

---

<sup>45</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817943566900977989>

<sup>46</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1817977058225701088>

<sup>47</sup> <https://x.com/NoticiasONU/status/1817981817175355889>

<sup>48</sup> <https://x.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1818020991987237075>

<sup>49</sup> <https://x.com/TransparenciaAL/status/1818372714488631733>

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.psuv.org.ve/portada/psuv-publica-actas-escrutinio-elecciones-14a-su-pagina-web/>



## Conclusions

The electoral process did not meet the most basic democratic standards, and the results announced by the CNE have been fabricated, constituting massive fraud.

The electoral process of the 2024 Venezuelan Presidential Elections was held in an autocratic context, in which the political rights of millions of potential voters were systematically violated, and that of dozens of leaders who were illegally disqualified through the Comptroller General of the Republic.

Given the lack of publication of tallies by the CNE, the opposition digitized and published 81% (until the time of writing this report) of the tallies of its witnesses, yielding a victory for Edmundo González, and exposing electoral fraud. mass organized by the CNE.

The fraud committed by the government of Nicolás Maduro generated spontaneous demonstrations throughout the country, which have been violently repressed. According to the NGO Foro Penal, from Monday, July 29 to Thursday, August 1, at least 11 murders and 672 arrests have been recorded within the framework of the protests.

The international community must urge the government of Nicolás Maduro to recognize the results. The prolongation of this conflict means more murders and arbitrary arrests against citizens who demand that the popular will be respected.