After more than two decades of late of Hugo Chávez so-called Bolivarian Revolution and his subsequent replacement with Nicolas Maduro, the crisis in Venezuela continues to worsen with little chance of short-term improvement. The error on the part of the US and international community error has been the simplification of the many aspects of the crisis in Venezuela. The various actors seeking miraculous solutions, the mistakes in poorly planned negotiations, the comparison with other countries with different realities, and the actions that are not well planned from the international community have allowed the regime to continue to consolidate over time. While some actions by the US government have increased pressure on the Nicolas Maduro regime, such as the numerous sanctions, the progressive implementation with a lack of long-term strategy and a lack of coordination in multiple areas has resulted in the regime finding alternatives to circumvent the sanctions and transfer the impacts to the rest of the population. Supporting the fiction of a “interim” government and engaging in multiple efforts to strengthen an alliance of opposition parties which are penetrated by the regime without strengthening other movements and leadership has proven to be a mistake after two years.

Nicolas Maduro's regime is based on a criminal structure that allows it to evade sanctions and maintain control based on repression, violence, social control, and the population's impoverishment. The international community's numerous failed attempts to seek negotiation between the government and the opposition, and the attempts of various political and religious actors to do so as well, have only benefited the regime. The policy of threatening "all open alternatives" has also not worked. The situation in Venezuela is variable and requires permanent monitoring.

Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOC) has asked experts in political analysis and scenario development in the country for multiple studies on the current political, economic, and social situation. This report carries out an analysis of short and medium-term possible scenarios on the political, economic, and social situation in Venezuela at the beginning of 2021 and gives recommendations for action on the subject with information available for the beginning of the year. The work is based on consultations with specialists in the country.

The most predictable scenario will be the regime pushing for a manipulated dialogue or negotiation with the political opposition and using the card of the municipal and governor election and the political prisoners as negotiation chips. Even in this scenario, the international community needs to plan ahead of time. In the short term, the outlook is for no improvement in the current situation. In the medium term, a change is possible, but it requires placing greater pressure on the regime and build a real broad opposition alliance. The recommendations are focused on being able to modify the perspectives that are held about the country gradually. Given the current scenario, we can say with a small chance or error that the inertial scenario and further scenarios (as desired by the regime) are very likely.

Scenarios announce themselves through early signs. These signs, events, developments, and conditions signal the development of scenarios. However, even the worst scenarios at sight
have left traces that unequivocally can be judged as their fingerprints. The scenarios in front of us could be perceived decades ago, although certainly with more uncertainty.

VOC wants to reflect those scenarios and some public policy recommendations to address some of the most credible possibilities for Venezuela.

**SHORT-TERM SCENARIOS**

1. **Continuation of the current status quo:** In the short term, a change in Venezuela's political and social situation is not very likely. Nicolás Maduro's dictatorship has shown that it is capable of strengthening itself in crises and planning its survival day-by-day in order to buy time. Also, the regime continues in its desire to finish capturing political power coupled with strong social demobilization, instigating division in the opposition, and persecuting the government's enemies. Regarding this last point, it is worth highlighting the regime's threats of capture or exile toward the opposition National Assembly former members, which was replaced by the fraudulent elections held a few months ago. Attention should be paid to whether this scenario advances towards a consolidated communal military regime or reaches constitutional socialism. The regime now controls all the institutions with Maduro's cronies.

2. **Strengthening of illegal economies:** One of the reasons why the Venezuelan regime has managed to survive is the illegal economies thriving in the country. This prospect seems to be strengthening in the short term. The participants have divided the country to exploit and dominate the assigned territories and thus enrich themselves. The illegal mining of gold, oil, drug trafficking, and the smuggling of all these products have generated a method by which the government has been able to circumvent the sanctions that have been imposed. While the vast majority of the population suffers an unprecedented economic crisis, the regime's allies, collectives, the military, armed groups, and drug traffickers profit from these activities: keeping “madurismo” afloat in illegality.

3. **Lack of credible threats against the regime:** A divided opposition, a very weakened Guaidó leadership, and persecution against detractors are conditions that create a terrible climate to threaten the power of the regime. In the short term, this does not seem possible to change. Indeed, the regime's pressure may advance much further. A massive demonstration like the one in previous years does not seem viable at this time, especially with the increased repression that is occurring during the Covid-19 pandemic. Not even humanitarian organizations have been spared the regime's persecution. The military and police are important participants in the illegal economy and continue to favor the regime. Other armed groups remain allies of the regime. Thus, a breakdown of the alliance is only viable in the medium term.

4. **Economic and humanitarian crisis ends:** Venezuela's population has not stopped suffering in recent years, and the pandemic may end up blowing up the country's poor economy. The regime's refusal to accept humanitarian aid impedes some of the international support for the country. Also, the food emergency that is growing in the country has been slowly increasing. The regime can use this crisis to monopolize the delivery of food products and close the door towards communal socialism. This only adds to the continuous hyperinflation that the country has experienced for years, which has caused the destruction of the Venezuelan bolivar and a pseudo-dollarization of the economy. This scenario does not appear likely to change anytime soon.
5. **Repression continues to increase**: The lack of the government's ability to paddle through the economic crisis with social plans has caused the entire social control game to focus on repression. The government continues to use its repressive force against any attempt to demonstrate and reduce the ability to operate any political or social factor. The use of the para-military government elite special forces (FAES) has been very effective for social control in the poor neighborhoods (barrios) through repression, extrajudicial killings, torture and fear-environment. Sometimes these force act in coordination with pro-government criminals in those communities to intimidate and prevent any uprising or demonstration.

6. **Advancement of the economic opening model with social control**: The regime has been relaxing the economic controls on the dollar and the exchange conversion, which allows the regime to manage a parallel economy in the country that allows the free circulation of foreign exchange flows from illegal money laundering and resources from the remittances of more than six million Venezuelans abroad who send money and food to their families. This has helped the government not to have to intervene in the economy, and a survival culture has been generated. In parallel, the corrupt class favored by the regime (the figureheads) (testaferros) has been "buying" the various companies that the state appropriated or it has granted various concessions to these companies. Maduro has been talking about a process of economic opening similar to China or Vietnam with political/security control by the regime and economic opening for the cronies and some risk takers investors. The regime will be betting into the lack of interest of risk-investors and the possibilities of privatization of the industry, tourism opportunities and transferring services controlled by the government. For this process to advance, the regime must seek a new negotiation to lift some of the sanctions. It looks like a good plan in paper, but the problem is the lack of capabilities in the government to run an organized economy, lack of institutions to guarantee stability for foreign investment and exponential corruption. Another major problem is the new economic elite, they made their fortunes with corruption and illegal activities, it is complicated to pass from a crock to a businessperson.

7. **Opposition to the measure of the regime**: The regime has been trying to generate its opposition with the political parties' internal divisions and visible leadership in Venezuela. Numerous opposition leaders have been accused of receiving money from figureheads of the regime. The strategies of these leaderships have been erratic and poorly planned. The need for some political factors to have positions of some level of power increases the pressure to negotiate better conditions to participate in elections for mayors and governors with the regime. Another factor are the “scorpions”, some factions of the opposition that have been openly collaborating with the regime and play a game of pretending opposition. The Scorpions took control of the legal structure of all the political parties and some of them were selected to participate in the Maduro’s parliament. The same political actors have been coexisting with the regime and became mutually dependent. Leopoldo Lopez have been trying to manipulate the game in his favor and trying to convince the international community that he is necessary and the only factor of leadership to unify the opposition and negotiate with the regime. Internally Guaido lost his credibility, people distrust Lopez game and G-4 and other political structures have been perceived as opportunistic and in collaboration with Maduro perpetually in power. This division and contradictions in the opposition will be a major factor in the chaotic negotiation with the regime.
8. **Weak Territorial movement remains a problem:** The lack of strategies to strengthen territorial movements and unions has left a minority group underrepresented in the opposition's voice. US and the international community concentrated their support to Guaido and G-4 instead of looking for leaders with mobilization capabilities. The regime has been persecuting and arresting leaders with connection with their bases. The reduction of the support to Guaido and G-4 and lack of “central” control of all the opposition elements by the political opposition probably will generate new leaderships in different areas including farmers, informal workers, union leaders, students, among others.

9. **A united opposition’s transformation with the madurismo in chaos:** Transformation of the united opposition is an important political and popular mobilization that effectively involves the entire nation with diverse territorial spots that converge with enormous international support. It is a deep transformation of parties and movements with an enormous unitary spirit. In it, (ex)ternal contradictions of the regime are exploited. A break occurs within the regime and trigger events capitalize in the short term rather than longer term incremental effects. International and transitional justice occurs and pathways of international justice and negotiation bear fruit.

10. **Resistance to the hybrid regime:** This scenario involves the huge tension in the country that is increasingly transformed into resistance. Unsustainability, repression, and tension cause an international action that calls for negotiations and cracks the support of allies of the regime. Internal contradictions of the regime are exploited.

11. **Resistance to the Communist:** In this scenario, the regime advances with force and imposes a formal or executive "constitutional regime" with all the powers at its command. It restricts freedom of association, assembly, etc., and it declares a socialist state republic. Cohesive parties in a united front mobilize the people, create a situation of ungovernability, and offer effective, massive, and intelligent resistance. Repression occurs as well as a major exodus and regional crisis. Leadership, parties, and social movements slowly strengthen with international support and put up resistance that can become a force for change. This scenario is unstable and unsustainable in peace. Internal contradictions of the regime are exploited. Negotiations and coordinate effective international pressure can trigger change. This scenario is unstable and untenable.

12. **Hybrid regime:** In this scenario, the regime looks for a negotiation with the controlled opposition and offers some power quotas, particularly in the economy and other areas not related to security, justice or military. This has been a scenario that the regime evaluated many times but it is not ready to take the risk. In other dictatorships these approaches brought mix-results.

13. **Inertia/lucky exit:** Despite the fact that the opposition has low cohesion, mobilization capacity, and organization, there is a rupture or discontinuity within the regime caused by exogenous factors, which are perhaps due to the actions of Just International or negotiations with internal inconsistencies. The regime takes advantage of the situation to continue in power. This scenario is a rollercoaster. International support is wasted and without the capacity to influence consistently and sustainably. This is an unstable and temporary transition scenario.

14. **Communal military regime:** In this scenario, all powers are captured by the regime, there is popular demobilization, and opposition parties are disintegrated. The regime advances in a communist ("communal") direction in an extra-constitutional way. Persecution of
union, civil or political organizations that express opposition to the regime by the military, paramilitary sector, and even by national and foreign guerrillas occurs. There is an exodus of the population. International initiatives give oxygen to the regime and international justice can introduce changes.

15. **Military Intervention (Coup D'état):** Hugo Chavez destroyed the ranks and the structure of the military to protect his regime and Nicolas Maduro continued the destruction. Almost all the top ranks participated in drug-trafficking, money laundering or major corruption. There is a link between the Testaferros and the military. Several cartels and mafias operate in Venezuela and they have been creating a vast spiderweb with the military. Lower ranks survive thanks to the contribution from higher ranks, bribery, social programs and lower-scale corruption. All the member of the military are closely follow and sanctioned for any comment against the regime. Any member of the military who opposed the regime is tortured and exposed as reference to prevent any military intervention. The only possibility of a Coup D'état is the disruptions of the sources of funds.

16. **Madurist Communism:** The regime advances strongly and imposes a new formal or executive “constitutional regime” with all powers under command. It declares a socialist or communal state republic. Persecution of union, civil, or political organizations that express opposition to the regime by the military, paramilitary sector, and even by national and foreign guerrillas, occurs. There is opposition without cohesion or connection with people. A major exodus and regional crisis occurs. There is freedom of economic action for investments from the regime’s international allies and internal collaborators. International allies of regimen harvest the country. This is a stable scenario for years or decades. International justice can impose adjustments.

17. **Geopolitical Support:** The regime moved from receiving economic support from China and Russia to a priority for those countries in terms of their geopolitical influence and the balance of power with the United States. China already secured control of key areas of Venezuela oil, communications, spectrum and mining areas. Russia moved from loans to international protection to the Maduro’s regime. Iran keeps playing behind the regime and Cuba continues its influence in different areas. For Russia is a game of antagonizing with the US and maintaining strongholds in Venezuela and Nicaragua. China and Cuba guarantee a broad support at the United Nations for Maduro’s regime.

18. **Electoral Show:** Maduro’s regime will use the card of the Mayor’s offices and governors’ elections as a way to share some power with some factors of the political opposition and guarantee some power-quotas. Maduro will also promise a Constitutional Referendum to evaluate his presidency in 2022. Time will be always in his side.

19. **Hands-off Venezuela:** Growing number of pro-Maduro supporters regaining power in Latin America will also strengthening the regime and will promote “dialogue” and hands-off policies. Elections in several Latin American countries have been bringing back old friend to Maduro to power. A strong thesis of “Hands-off Venezuela” is growing with the support of Argentina, Mexico and Bolivia, plus the alliances with Cuba and Nicaragua. Potential victory of Correa’s candidate in Ecuador, as well as changes in Honduras, Chile and Guatemala, and the support from Caribbean countries, will reduce the Organization of American States (OAS) engagement with Venezuela and they will pressure US to support a negotiation with Maduro in power. Several internal factors in the US will also contribute with this approach.
20. **Negotiation and dialogue:** Nicolas Maduro's regime has various international operators that allow it to maintain some level of maneuvering and support countries such as Russia, Turkey, and China. The regime has been using Spain’s former prime minister Jose Rodriguez-Zapatero to gain international support for the regime and force the opposition into a “dialogue” with Maduro, former Colombia President Jose Manuel Santos also began to operate with Rodriguez Zapatero. The international community's fatigue and the exhaustion of other alternatives will lead to new negotiations between the government and a small group of opponents. Cuba seeks to play a starring role in organizing negotiations that gives it advantages and eliminates sanctions for Cuba and Venezuela in exchange for better electoral conditions for a possible election of mayors and governors and the promise of a possible referendum in 2022.

**MEDIUM-TERM SCENARIOS**

21. **Perpetuation of “Madurismo”:** Slowly, and in the medium term, the Maduro regime can complete its perpetuation. The way to do it has been building, and the only thing that prevents it seems to be the economic crisis. Despite this, the dictatorship's strategic allies continue to keep it in power thanks to the illegal economy that dodges sanctions. It has also been positioning Venezuela as a headquarters for the ideological and geopolitical conflicts of Russia, Iran, the United States, and Cuba, among others. This makes it difficult for Maduro to move with his well-established alliances without something radically different happening internally. It seems difficult for this to happen, especially with the systematic repression, opposition disunity, and possible constitutional changes with the National Assembly that are on the way.

22. **Headquarters of American terrorism and regionalization:** Part of Venezuela's geopolitical importance is because it is the seat of many anti-Western powers: Russia, Cuba, Iran, and, to a lesser extent, China. One problem that may emerge is the direction of Hezbollah-led terrorist attacks or attacks against US allies from Venezuela. There is evidence that members of this organization have a presence in the country, so it is a latent risk that they may try to attack. Furthermore, the intellectual contributions that all these countries give may make them seek to regionalize the "Bolivarian revolution." This could mean the regime giving more support to allies within countries that are not allied to try to turn them in favor of Venezuela and change the region's support structure.

23. **Internal lack of control:** The illegal economy has meant the loss of territorial control in much of the Maduro dictatorship territory. Eventually, this will end up causing a struggle for resources between the different groups that exploit parts of the country. This internal conflict could weaken the regime, which economically depends on these organizations' illegal activities. The military could also lose the economic benefit they have from supporting the regime and turn against Maduro. This would end up dispersing the country's territorial power. Those who would suffer the most would be the population, who could not oppose the armed groups and do not have an organization with a dispersed opposition. Attention should be paid to the border situation with Colombia, the Amazon, and Guyana. Drug trafficking, smuggling, and illegal mining continue to take advantage of the regime's territorial weakness and increase daily. The alternative that maturity is generating is a decrease in the power of groups that can generate risk (as in Disodado Cabello and other internal factors). On the other hand, the regime has been distributing
companies, concessions, and power in various illegal and legal businesses among its allies, which is a strategy that can generate security for it in the medium term.

24. **Opposition resurgence**: This scenario needs the most changes to make it happen. An opposition unification is mobilized to confront the regime. It occurs behind strong leadership and takes advantage of the regime's economic weaknesses, strong international pressure for sanctions, strengthened unions, more grassroots leaderships and a population tired of the harassment and repression of the pandemic. They should be careful with the negotiations that the regime normally uses to buy time and be wary that the opposition may lose momentum. Likewise, for this scenario to happen, international pressure must flourish with the complaints of human rights violations in the International Criminal Court and the continuation and expansion of sanctions against the country's usurpers. It should also be taken into account how the persecution of opponents continues, especially now that there is a tighter control of state organizations and alliances with anti-Western powers that support the persecution.

**EARLY CONCLUSIONS**

1. The scenarios are the outcome of the evolution of major macro variables. Thus, preventing the scenarios means preventing variables from moving in certain directions.
2. Early warnings and recent moves indicate that the most likely scenarios are a regime looking to survive using the negotiation of the upcoming local elections as a tool to gain more time while advancing to a partial opening of the economy for its closest economic forces (testaferros).
3. The regime’s forces in place have had a steady path of evolution that has been affected by a lack of resources and an institutional framework that still has traces of constitutionality, although is being disputed nationally and internationally.
4. Late electoral moves come on behalf of the regime and push towards tougher scenarios. Their unconstitutionality should not be normalized.
5. The regime’s capacities have been created and developed over decades. What seems more difficult to improve is the opposition’s capacity including its strategic and organizational capacities and their connection to the people and mobilization of the country.
6. The regime has been using false dialogue and negotiation process to manipulate the international community and the opposition. Lack of real conditions or consequences, as well as wrong or coopted negotiators by the opposition allowed the regime to gain time and get stronger after each process.
7. It is very likely that the international pressure to craft a political solution finds the opposition dispersed and without the capacities to sustain and take advantage of the opportunity. This will have major implications in many respects.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Opposition’s Capabilities**:¹

¹ As opposition, we mean major political parties, social movements (education, workers, business, religions, academy, etc.), and key influencers and leaders all acting with different degrees of unified strategies (DUS) and with
• Change starts with **attitude**. An acknowledgement of this is essential at the top level of the opposition, and as strategy is action, the start is much more than. It goes beyond statements. It is strategy in action and strategy by example. Open dialogue and compromise is a major need, as well as real strategic planning and systemic thinking.

• Changing the approach and helping to build a strong opposition, not a fictitious government. The opposition created a fiction of an “interim government,” which has been in operation with an illusion of power. That fiction concentrated all the energies into a failed approach. The opposition played the game of parallel government instead of looking for strong partnerships and networks among all the internal forces. A more coordinated effort will work, as well as reducing the central role of the failed political opposition and substitute it for a more cohesive diverse movement.

• Preventing short-term approaches supporting existing leaderships from the political opposition in exile or part of the G-4. Expand the opposition base allowing the strengthening of natural leaders in the regions and support the strengthening of territorial movements such as unions and other movements that allow social mobilization. Without internal pressure, the regime cannot seek a negotiated solution.

• Work towards a union in the internal opposition of Venezuela and international allies against Nicolás Maduro’s regime in search of making a common plan of action. This implies increasing the mobilization capacity and creating strong leadership and other minors dispersed in different areas of the country. Above all, promote a change of leadership and the expansion of the opposition platform, Guaido, the G-4, and other leadership as part of a great movement (not maintaining the kidnapping they have of the opposition). Diverse voices from unions, students, and religious and academic movements would renew the opposition and provide a greater capacity to act.

• Craft unitary agreements at the top with a real commitment to organize and mobilize the country. This enabler of change shortens and fastens the complex and necessary downstream organizational arrangements. The international community (countries, think tanks) can help in this matter by persuading the leadership.

• Enhancing the opposition’s capacities is vital to improve its role in Venezuela’s future. It is necessary to recognize that political capacities take time to change incrementally and to be created or reinforced, increased, proved, and sharpened. A multilevel accelerated training program is recommended. Specifically, an assessment and consulting work towards strategy and organization in resistance is needed. To avoid an incremental approach to increase capacities seems obvious. Utilizing innovative approaches to increase capacities and to adapt the process to implement it during dictatorship is necessary, too.

• These capacities include a whole repertoire of non-violent techniques devoted to act under repressive conditions. A massive training with Training of Trainers accelerators is needed.

• With a solid narrative, a consistent communication and counter-communication efforts should be put in place targeting the people of the country. A Communication Lab targeting the best ways to enhance communication with marketing techniques is required.

• The near goal is to act at the national, territorial, and local level and be united and unified to oppose dictatorship in every possible regard.

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the purpose of restoring democracy in Venezuela. DUS is a key ingredient of the macro variable that enables the opposition and its connection and capacity to mobilize the whole country.
• It is necessary to create a complete stakeholder mapping of Venezuela to understand the diversity of interests within the country fully. In this way, we can identify all the participants, both allies and opponents, who can create situations of change.
• Develop a permanent strategy of political planning, systemic thinking, and scenario analysis that allows decision-making in changing environments

Regime’s Capabilities:²
• Change starts with attitude: it is necessary to acknowledge that the regime’s capacities are enormous and have been crafted over decades.
• A continuous mapping of the regime’s capabilities is needed. It is critical to understand how these capabilities are structured, how they have changed, how they evolved, and the more important weaknesses, key actors, and hierarchies. It is necessary to investigate how illegal economies work fully: the distribution of territories, how money is taken out of the country, who covers it, how much is taken out, who carries it out, where it goes, etc. The goal is to attack this source of financing of the regime, which it uses to avoid sanctions.
• Create counter-communication action plans that face the publicity of the regime. These can be carried out through independent media, intelligence, or by creating conflicts within Maduro’s allies, for example, by giving a speech showing clearly that Maduro is not Chávez.

Negotiation and Dialogue:
• Negotiation is only viable if representative opposition factors participate and are not co-opted by the regime in a planned process with clear, open rules and roadmaps that have precise objectives and short times, a reliable and neutral arbitrator, and serious repercussions for the regime in the event of non-compliance or manipulation of the process. A new dialogue without real conditions favors the regime with more time.
• There is also the need of different leaders at the negotiation table to prevent coopted political opposition to enter into a negotiation without previous conditions, sanctions and clear process. Strengthening leaderships from the student/youth, unions, faith-based, farmers and other movements will help them to have a voice.
• Neutralizing the tactical capacity of the regime to set the rules for negotiations should be encouraged. Again, the framing of the regime’s own positioning as legitimate should be avoided.
• Cuba’s blackmail to try to benefit from the situation in Venezuela should be avoided by offering its space as a friendly composer. In the end, it is a game that only benefits Cuba.
• US cannot lift any sanction as good will or as an strategy, to the contrary, the US need to move forward with more sanctions and other pressure points to increase the pressure against the regime and force it to look for a real negotiation.

Internationally:
• It is necessary to acknowledge that the regime’s capacity, protected by the network of international, intertwined interests regarding Venezuela, makes it very difficult to rescue democracy without the participation of the international community.

² By regime’s capacities, we mean all the different capacities and strengths that possess the dictatorship, including its owned political capacities (PSUV, PP); paramilitaries; institutions (National Government and most State Governments, National Assembly, Supreme Court and lower courts, Electoral Council); and international allies (Cuba, Russia, China, Turkey, Uganda, Naciones Unidas, and Foro de Sao Paulo).
• Consistent international communication and counter-communication efforts should emphasize the role of Venezuela in international crime, its destabilization, and the specific enabling support from specific countries. As an example, we need to counteract the normalization of the pervasive unconstitutionality of Venezuela’s regime.

• Sanctions specifically targeted to individuals and companies should be in place and be used as a dissuasive tool. New examples are needed beyond the case of the Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM) Director. Sanctions against members of the regime must continue to be carried out and expanded towards allies outside the government, such as the military, collectives, armed groups, and front men. However, sanctions do not work much if they continue to avoid illegal economies: smuggling, illegal mining, and drug trafficking. The lifting of sanctions without real change benefits the regime.

• International pressure must also go through human rights and the possible trial of the International Criminal Court against the regime for violations against them. Research on this topic could continue to be expanded and publicized. One that is highly commented on in the reports consulted is human trafficking.

• Humanitarian aid must continue so that the regime does not co-opt the mechanisms to obtain food. Organizations that are acting in these areas should be monitored and supported in pursuing their mission.

• A conversation should be opened with the governments that give international strength to the Nicolas Maduro regime, particularly China and Russia.

• A completely new framing of the Venezuelan case towards free, transparent elections should be produced utilizing a systemic approach beyond the “electoral system.” As an example, currently, the lack of an independent media restricts the communication capacity, the reach of any entity or individual is perceived as an “enemy of the revolution,” and the right of the people of Venezuela to be informed is denied. This could be tackled by the Communications Lab and perhaps through the judicial arena.

• In terms of counter-communication efforts, it should be emphasized that a systematic approach is urgently needed, as well as a steady operational capacity to identify, understand, and counter cyber and digital attacks on the opposition.

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